The cost of consultation is now the target. On 10 September 2026, Louise Haigh MP, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and First Secretary of State, announced the government’s intention to eliminate what it calls needless box-ticking consultations, framing the move as a delivery measure aimed at cutting the delays that slow policy and secondary legislation. A letter of 7 September 2026 set the economic tone bluntly: consultation culture has turned a sensible mechanism for sourcing external input into an industry of dither and delay. The press release cited two examples it says were held up by redundant consultations, the introduction of folic acid into flour and the microchipping of cats.
For investors, operators and anyone whose capital depends on the pace of state decision-making, the announcement matters because consultations sit directly on the critical path of delivery. The proposed fix is to limit consultations to cases where there is a statutory requirement to consult, where it would be conspicuously unfair not to consult, or where ministers believe there is a good case for seeking external input and that a formal consultation is the right vehicle for it. Existing explicitly stated obligations to consult would, under the proposals, be repealed and retained only exceptionally.
The legal architecture explains why the government sees friction here. There is no general common law duty to consult; it arises either because statute imposes it, or because fairness demands it. Courts have recognised three further gateways rooted in fairness: where an authority has promised to consult, where an established practice of consultation amounts to an assurance, and where failure to consult would produce conspicuous unfairness. Promises must be clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification to create a legitimate expectation, and even then a duty to consult follows only in a narrow range of cases where failure would amount to an abuse of power. By process of elimination, the government’s package appears aimed at the promise and established-practice gateways, since statute and conspicuous unfairness are preserved.
The sub-proposals carry direct market implications. Parliament would be empowered to designate and approve certain infrastructure projects, granting them enhanced protection from legal challenge. A new fixed Challenge Window would ensure points of legal challenge are identified and addressed earlier. Consultations would proceed only where there is a clear reason to do so, and guidance will confirm that legal risk should inform ministers’ decisions, not dictate them. For developers and funders of major projects, the promise of faster consent is the headline attraction. The risk is that the mechanism does not survive judicial scrutiny.
That risk is material. The author argues the fixed Challenge Window raises questions of lawfulness, since shortening the period for challenge could in substance weaken judicial oversight if claimants cannot reasonably identify grounds within it. The infrastructure sub-proposal may also collide with international obligations. Articles 6 and 7 of the Aarhus Convention set minimum standards for public participation, and Article 9 guarantees access to justice in environmental matters, with Article 9(2) securing enforcement of participation rights. Policies shielding projects from legal challenge may prevent adequate enforcement of those obligations or limit access to justice where environmental law is allegedly violated. Litigation on this basis, the analysis suggests, seems inevitable.
The third sub-proposal, restricting consultations to cases with a clear reason, may change little. A promise to consult could itself constitute a clear reason, as could an established practice of consultation, so the scope of the duty may be untouched. Its vagueness, however, invites challenge, adding further delay to the very delivery problem the reforms claim to solve. Meanwhile, the announcement itself carries legal weight: by signalling in advance a reluctance to consult, it may undermine legitimate expectations and thereby narrow the duty in practice.
The bottom line for market watchers is that the reforms appear to offer little substantive change. Measured against the current law, it is not clear the number of lawfully required consultations would fall meaningfully. The proposals restate the existing rule in different language, and their fate may hinge on whether they survive legal challenge at all. The full analysis, published by The Constitution Society at https://consoc.org.uk/policy-squared-consultations/, is written by Ananya Kumar-Banerjee, a Lincoln’s Inn Lord Denning Scholar, and the views expressed are her own. Whether the episode signals a broader capacity to fix the machinery of the British state remains, on this evidence, an open question.